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THE MYSTICAL AND THE PERSONAL 
IN EMIL BRUNNER AND 
BARON VON HUGEL 
by Margaret Lewis Furse 
In reading the Neo-Orthodox theoIogians from the vantage point of the 
seventies, one cannot escape the impression that the subjectivist trend in 
Schleiermacher and the outright subjectivism of Feuerbach had impelled 
their readers to over-react against all forms of "subjectivism." One result is 
that Neo-Orthodoxy developed its admirably systematic statements of 
Christian doctrine in a way that all but expunged the mystical, quietistic, 
and contemplative elements in Christian piety. These elements were regarded 
as "subjective feelings." Partly this judgment was influenced by Neo- 
Orthodoxy's dependence on Martin Buber. As is well known, Martin Buber 
was, at one time, a mystic himself. He was fond of Meister Eckhart, and he 
wrote a book on mysticism called Ekstatischen Konfessionen. His discovery 
of the theology of "relation," however, marked, to his mind, a conversion 
away from mystical "absorption." So  thorough was his repentance that 
thereafter he always described the "I-Thou" relationship as a contrast to 
mysticism. A mystical "feeling," as he described it, is something I possess 
inside myself; it cannot be a reciprocal, face-to-face, relationship. 
In Neo-Orthodoxy, especially as it is exemplified in Emil Brunner, the 
"mystical" and the "personal" are treated as antithetical types of religion- 
the one of immanence, the other of transcendence. Drawing on Buber, 
Christianity is described as a "personal" faith, by which is meant that man 
is addressed by the transcendent God in the revelatory word, "thou." This 
"addressability" is held to constitute man's "personhood." The mystical type 
of religion is then interpreted as a religion of immanence in which man's 
task is to develop his inherent potentiality-to become more and more 
divine as he climbs upward t o  God on a "ladder of ascent." This traditional 
mystic "way" is interpreted by Neo-Orthodoxy as a seIf-aggrandizing en- 
croachment on the sovereignty of God; it seems to belie man's need for grace 
bestowed from above and unmerited below-the Reformation doctrine of 
sola fide. 
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Needless t o  say, a result of these alignments (mystical with an "impersonal" 
self-help program; and "personal" with I-Thou encounter) is that the Catholic 
(and indeed the Protestant sectarian) appreciation for contemplation, prayer, 
and quietism tends to be excluded systematically. Today, there is evidence 
of a change of theological perspective on the "mystical" as a subject of critical 
inquiry and popular interest. There is, for example, an unmistakable popular 
and theoretical interest in Zen and Vedantism. There is, also, a remarkable 
willingness on the part of some Christian traditionalists, such as Benedictines, 
to  adopt Eastern meditative techniques.' Such changes point to a need to 
apply theological tools to  mysticism; unfortunately, in the recent past, the 
Neo-Orthodox charge against mysticism as "depersonalizing" has excluded 
it as a central emphasis in the Protestant form of Christianity. The result is 
that now, at a time when contemplative values have great popular appeal, 
we do not have a legacy of deep-going scholarship to draw on-nor even a 
continuing Catholic-Protestant discussion of contemplative values. 
An important anti-mystic among the Neo-Orthodox is Emil Brunner 
(1889 - 1966). Brunner's antipathy toward mysticism is shown in his critique 
of Schleiermacher, Die Mystik und Das Wort, and in the larger corpus of 
his theology where he seeks to elucidate the contrast between mysticism on 
the one hand and I-Thou personalism on the other. Brunner, in his earIy 
ministry, was a Swiss pastor. Later, he became a professor of Systematic 
and Practical Theology at the University of Zurich. His famous "contro- 
versy" with Karl Barth, as reflected in their respective articles, "Natur und 
Gnade" and "Nein!" (1934), turned on an important but technical point: the 
extent to which each was willing to  grant the legitimacy of a "natural" as 
opposed to a "revealed" theology. 
Barth's general position at that time was darkly pessimistic as t o  what 
man, unaided by divine grace, can know of God. He rejected any "point of 
connection" (Anknijpfungspunktj between man as he is in nature, and God. 
Brunner took a less uncompromising, and in some ways less consistent 
stand, in which he cautioned against interpreting the sola gratia of the Re- 
formation so as "to confuse the absolute receptivity of man in revelation 
with an objective passivity from which all human activity, as such, could be 
entirely eliminated. . . . There can be no question of ignoring man, as a 
human partner in the process of revelation."' 
Both Barth and Brunner, however, were concerned to put special stress on 
the sola gratia doctrine of their Protestant heritage, and in doing so they 
especially stressed the "discontinuity" of any pathway from man upwards 
to God. 
Brunner on Imago Dei. Of chief importance for the treatment of mysticism 
was the fact that in the zeal of Neo-Orthodoxy to  preserve the "personal," 
it held that mysticism as an example of an  unbroken upward movement 
was, therefore, "impersonal." Brunner, while not pressing as far as Barth, 
still had to interpret Imago Deiin such a way as to avoid a simple "continuity" 
between human nature and divine nature. Though Brunner's own use of 
"formal" and "material" Imago sometimes obscured his aims, his intention 
was to interpret the Imago Dei not in terms of fixed Aristotelian and scho- 
lastic thought-forms of form and matter but in terms of a dynamic personal 
relationship. Man is a "responsive," "answering," "responsible being."3 
The perennial theological question was, "Does man lose the Imago Dei 
through sin?" If the answer were "Yes," then the further question arose 
whether man then also, in sin, lost his humanity and thus his responsibility 
for his sin; for if man were not fully human in the act or state of sin, how 
could he, any more than a dog or a cat, be held responsible for it? 
If the answer were "No, man does not lose the Imago Dei but retains it 
fully even in sin," then the implication seemed to be that there is deep within 
human nature an undefiled part, a supernatural element that remains un- 
touched by sin. This answer would imply a rejection of the Reformation 
doctrine of total depravity, a weakening of the seriousness with which 
Protestantism views sin, and an open door to  mystical immanence. 
The traditional grappling with this dilemma both by the Catholic and by 
the Protestant tradition never quite succeeded in going beyond the Aristo- 
telian substance-attribute context of the problem. It took the form of a 
quibble about the extent of the Imago's loss. 
The traditional Catholic answer, associated with Irenaeus, involved the 
distinction between Imago and "likeness" o r  "similitude," Sin is regarded as 
destroying the "likeness" of God in man but not human nature, the Imago, 
itself, The Reformation tried to solve the problem by saying that the Imago 
itself is destroyed by sin-which is to  say that man's humanity is destroyed. 
Somewhat inconsistently, the Reformers then added that a "relic" or 
"remnant1'4 of the Imago is preserved like a hollow shell. This shell is just 
enough to account for man's continuing humanity and to distinguish him 
from the animals, 
Thus Luther specifically rejected the view that "Man is created after the 
'similitude' of God. . . ." Those "Divines," he said, who hold to  "similitude," 
assume that it consists in a "perfectness" of man's "mind, memory, and will." 
Luther objected in typically strenuous language: 
Memory, mind, and w~ll ,  we d o  most certainly possess; but wholly corrupted, and most 
miserably weakened; nay, (that 1 may speak with greater plainness,) utterly leprous, and 
Unclean. If these natural endowments therefore constitute the image of God, it will inevit- 
ably follow, that Satan also was created in the image of God.. . . For he has a memory and 
intellect the most powerful, and a will most o b ~ t i n a t e . ~  
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Nevertheless, for Luther, total corruption need not mean that man is 
dehumanized. Man, though totally corrupt, is still a man "even as we still 
call a leprous man a man. . . ."6 
Today these conceptions seem quite artificial. An attempt to understand 
man's sense of responsibility and sense of failure and loss solely in terms of 
the classical language of substance and attribute appears inadequate. To 
Brunner's great credit, he tried to reinterpret the Imago in the analogy of 
relationship so as to avoid thinking of it as a "thing" to  be kept or lost. 
He held that "we must conceive the idea of Imago Dei in a completely 
personalistic and actual manner, which means that we must do  away with 
the Aristotelian idea of the animal rationale. "7  A concomitant of Brunner's 
reinterpretation is that it became necessary to say that even in sin man 
displays his Imago. That man is man depends on man's present and con- 
tinuing relationship with God-and not on the quality or moral character 
of that relationship. 
Sin itself is a testimony to the divine origin of man. Even where man revolts against God 
th tltanic rebeIlion, and withgreat daring and ~nsolence "gets rid" of Him, or  deif~es h~mself, 
even there, behind the human perversion, the Divine image itself looks forth.8 
Brunner's motive for saying that man's sin is itself an indication of Imago 
is that he wishes to stress that man's very being as man derives from a 
personal relationship with God-which relationship Brunner must there- 
fore hold will always persist even in man's sinful rebellion against God. 
But there is a remaining problem. If the Imago is held to continue even in 
sin-and even to be, as Brunner suggests, especially manifest in sin-will 
it not appear that sin is a merely superficial disruption of the man-God 
relation which has no effect on that deeper, more essential personal 
relationship which continues between man and God? If this is true, have 
we not arrived at that rational continuity and immanence which Brunner 
everywhere takes such care to  renounce? 
According to Brunner, however, this continuing "formal" Imago does 
not run the risk of a deification of human nature because it is interpreted 
as a relationship and not as an e n d ~ w m e n t . ~  The latter view "is the gate 
by which a pantheistic or an idealistic deification of man can enter." 
According to this view, "man then possesses the divine reason in himself; 
his spirit is then a 'spark' from the Divine Spirit. He has 'divinity within 
himself."'lo Brunner's whole theology, as well as Barth's, is meant to stem 
the tide of this sort of Immanentism, which he never tires of warning 
against. God is not to be "located" within man, either in man's mystical or 
rational consciousness; nor is man to be absorbed by an engulfing Deity, 
modeled on the Neoplatonist "One." Man knows God, not by an intro- 
spective apprehension of his own essential nature but by entering into a 
man-God relationship, characterized as I-Thou encounter, a relationship 
that preserves face-to-face "over-againstness." To Brunner's mind, only 
paradox or  logical "discontinuity" can express the "personalness" of such 
a relationship. 
Discontinuity o f  Reason as a Condit ion o f  the  "Personal." While 
Brunner makes continual use of paradox and also recognizes the use made 
of it by forms of mysticism and Idealism, he must on no account admit 
that his own use and that of mysticism are in any way similar. At several 
points he implies, rather than fully develops, what the difference is.11 The 
mystical type of paradox Brunner regards as being used by Reason and as 
being compatible with Reason which "wills unity." But the mystics' use of 
paradox does not, to his mind, indicate the discontinuity that he thinks is 
required by Revelation. His own use, in contrast, is meant to illustrate the 
complete inapplicability of the techniques of Reason (and its requirement 
of the object-subject antithesis) to the subject matter at hand-the personal. 
In this case his own use is meant to  display Reason in a broken state. If, by 
this use of paradox, he shows Reason to be broken, then we will cease 
looking to it for the truth. In this sense, despair of Rationality is the "ante- 
chamber" of faith-and here we recognize the theme of Kierkegaard. 
Ceasing to look to Reason for the truth, to Brunner, means ceasing to look 
at oneseR for Reason, as autonomous, he always regards as an extension 
of the self. His own paradoxes are intended to function, then, as sign posts 
which say, "Dead End, turn another way." In this turning is a decision 
and the beginning of faith. The paradoxes of mysticism do not, in his view, 
show Reason in a broken state, but encourage perseverance, rather than 
turning away. They are like sign posts which say "Poor Visibility, look 
more carefully.'' 
A basic assumption throughout Brunner's theology is that there are 
two kinds of truth and that there is a radical difference between the two. 
The kind of truth in terms of which the Christian Faith can be claimed to 
be "true," he calls "truth as encounter," or "Biblical truth." In opposition 
to this is the conception of truth which he believes has dominated the 
whole of Western philosophy, a conception that divides statements accord- 
ing to the model of "objectivity" or "subjectivity." Brunner makes his 
division between the two kinds of truth quite radical. Biblical 'truth' is 
"as different from what otherwise is called truth as this personal encounter 
. . . is different from the comprehension of facts by means of reasoning."" 
The Christian faith has no claim to the truth, he says, "if science, with the 
objectivism of its concept of the truth is the truth,"l3 The distinguishing 
feature of truth as encounter is that it is "personal" and that it contrasts 
absolutely with the traditional view of truth as seeking an object and, 
therefore, as "impersonal." 
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This separation of the two kinds of truth implies a radical separation of 
two kinds of discipline: There is, on the one hand, the discipline of theology, 
and on the other the interests of the philosopher, the scientist, or the 
historian. The latter deal with issues on the level of "immanence" and 
"continuity." That is, they start with man and ask what his problems are 
and how he can, within his own capabilities, resolve them. The methodology 
of these disciplines necessarily assumes a "continuity" of reason, the bias 
of which, according to Brunner, favors a man-centered world and rejects 
revelation as an irrational "discontinuity." Therefore, says Brunner, we 
can carry over "no philosophical judgments" into theology. The theologian 
is concerned with "something sui generis, namely, the correIation between 
the Word of God and faith," and the "nature of this correlation cannot be 
derived from any general philosophical propositions , . . even those of 
existential philosophy . . . ."I4 Theology deals systematically with the 
divine revelation of the Bible; Christian philosophy is the reflection of the 
believing Christian about being and about existing realities disclosed in 
experience. 
Nevertheless, there can be a Christian philosophy, Brunner admits 
(and in this he most cIearIy distinguishes himself from Karl Barth), provided 
the limitations of reason are acknowledged at the beginning. A Christian 
philosophy would be a philosophy freed of "the illusory prejudice of 
autonomy."l5 And here, as elsewhere in his theology, he shows a certain 
affinity for Kantian critical philosophy. 
One of the disputed benefits of the radical division of labor is that 
theology is apparently exempt from the onsIaughts of historical, scientific, 
or philosophical inquiry. There is, however, some equivocation in Brunner 
on this point. He often says that the Christian Faith must aIways be 
vulnerable to these disciplines, since it is concerned with "brute fact,"16 
which is open to non-theological scrutiny. He is quite clear, however, 
that the believer's faith is not delivered to  him by these disciplines nor 
jeopardized by them, but "comes" rather by a revelatory intrusion that 
represents, from the standpoint of such disciplines, a "discontinuity" of 
their method. 
Freedom of inquiry appears to  be one of the real benefits (and perhaps 
a motivating idea) in Brunner's distinction between truth as Encounter, 
and truth as employed by science and philosophical inquiry; and Brunner 
is surely a man whose liberal spirit showed in everything he wrote, Never- 
theless, this freedom is won at some risk, specifically at the risk of making 
the Christian Faith an exclusive enclave of believers who talk to one 
another in their special language, theology. Freedom to inquire is so 
easily granted and embarked on precisely because an  "inquiry" can never 
really reach the essentials of the Christian Faith, which Brunner regards 
as an altogether different sphere, that of Encounter. Brunner's attitude 
toward Kant is instructive here. Religion within the limits of pure reason 
appears to Brunner to be an  impossibility, but one of the things Brunner 
apparently accepts from Kant is the hard line between reason and faith. 
He is thus left to establish religion within the limits of pure revelation, 
whose rational expression can then only take the form of paradox, display- 
ing reason in its broken state. 
According to Brunner it is precisely the irrationality, or more exactly, 
the "discontinuity," that expresses the personal nature of Encounter. This 
theme is particularly evident in his view of Christology in The Mediator. 
In this book Brunner is insistent on the logical absurdity and rational 
discontinuity of Revelation because only by way of this discontinuity can 
the personal character of the relationship find expression. 
We must have rational clarity and s~mplicity or paradox! ... It would not be a divine 
revelat~on at all if it could be grasped by the mind, if it could be "perceived.". . . Revelation 
. .. cannot be anything other than illogical, since it breaks through the continuity of the 
human and natural sphere in general." 
It is obvious that Brunner would (and did) vigorously oppose the Liberal 
theological tradition on the grounds that it assumed that by employing the 
humanistic methods of the historian, it could simply discover the Christ of 
faith by looking into the sources. The Liberal tradition never, to Brunner's 
mind, achieved what he himself meant by a "personal" relationship because 
it never abandoned its hope of finding God in "continuity" with a program 
initiated and fulfilled by the self. 
Discontinuity in Ethics as a Condition of the "Personal." Because Kant 
recognized the challenge of the present moment and crisis of decision in a 
way that Hegelian Idealism, for example, with its long-term view, could 
not, Brunner characterized the ethical theories of Kant as a promising 
starting point. "Decision," he said, was "a flying leap, rather than a gliding 
motion." Brunner looks to decision as a moment in which the breach of 
rational continuity occurs. Ultimately, however, Brunner quarrels with 
Kant7s efforts to establish ethical autonomy on the basis of a rational uni- 
versal principle instead of on the basis of an irrational revelatory intrusion 
into the whole cloth of reason. Alas, Kant was a philosopher and not a Neo- 
Orthodox theologian! Brunner also found a difficulty in Kant's principle 
of autonomy-the fact that it is "I" who command myself: If one takes the 
identity of Law-giver and Self seriously, then the inmost part of the wilI 
becomes deified, so Brunner fears, and evil is assigned to the non-intelligible, 
empirical self, and man's sinfulness loses its seriousness.l8 
Generally, with respect to ethics, Brunner accepts from Kant two em- 
phases. He accepts the formalism which would relieve him of a heterono- 
mous prescription of the contents of the ethical command. He also accepts 
8 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
the importance of the moral command; at least, it is the sense of obligation 
and obedience and of decision in the face of this command that is stressed 
in Brunner. What he rejects is the attempt on the part of Kant to  justify the 
ethical command by virtue of its immanent universality (rational continuity). 
But if Brunner is to accept the Kantian formalism without its universal 
rational justification, he can do so only by especialIy stressing the irration- 
ality or discontinuity of the command. Such a command must be addressed 
to the believer in the "Word." As such it breaks in upon him and can never, 
on the basis of any immanent rational principle, be predicted by him. 
Such a command cannot be known beforehand or else instead of a com- 
mand there will be a regulation.19 If, however, there can be no principIe by 
which one can know beforehand what the will of God is, then is it not 
implied that one receives it more or less spontaneously and directly (i.e., 
immediately) in present time? While Brunner wishes to avoid such a con- 
clusion, at several points he seems to suggest that the unprincipled nature 
of the command is the condition of its authenticity: 
Hence I cannot know beforehand the content of the Command as I can know that of the 
Law. I can only receive it  afresh each time through the voice of the S ~ i r i t . 2 ~  
As there can be no preconceived "principle" of Christian ethics, neither 
can there be a motive for love of neighbor. Only the love which is without 
a reason is real love; otherwise it is not a love of the person but a love of an 
idea." "The man who loves without conditions . . . does not allow his 
attitude to be determined by the attitude of the other. . . . he no longer loves 
him 'for something,' but simply because he is his fellow man, not because 
he is a man of a certain kind, but simply because he exists. That is what it 
means to love our neighbor." It is the "unrestricted recognition of the other 
man, without considering what he is like. . . ."22 
At rimes the unmotivated nature of love is stressed to the point of de- 
priving the community of a way of discriminating and assessing priorities 
for service. "Your neighbor is the person who meets you. In the 'Calling' 
your neighbor is given to you; you do not need to hunt for him, therefore 
you do not need to search for the sphere of service. It is not for us to choose 
the tasks which God has thought out and destined for  US."^^ 
Nor is it permissible for a moral evaluation of the neighbor to be allowed 
to be a motive. Whether he is possessed of a righteous or unrighteous will 
should not have the least effect on love. If love took into consideration 
such moral facts as these, it would lose its innocent, unmotivated character. 
This character can only be maintained by "the irrational nature of love."*4 
We can see that no reason, no motive for love can be tolerated-not even 
the motive of another's moral excellence and lovableness. For to love out 
of consideration for moral excellence is still to  have a motive and means 
that an idea or thing is what is loved rather than the persan himself. 
Brunner: The Personal Versus the Mystical. When we ask what conditions 
Brunner requires in order to establish the "personal," we may summarize 
them with the two phrases rational discontinuity (expressed as paradox) 
and ethical discontinuity (expressed as decision and unmotivated love). 
Brunner is vigorous and impressively earnest in proclaiming that the 
Christian faith alone fulfills these requirements and that other religions 
and philosophies which assume an unbroken line of continuity cannot do 
so. Ultimately, there are, for Brunner, only two ways of relating to God: 
either the way of mysticism or the way of faith.25 This contrast is as funda- 
mental as the contrast between the truth of the subject-object antithesis 
and truth as encounter, and has the effect of putting into the same category 
with mysticism an astonishing variety26 of religions and philosophies and 
of opposing them all t o  the Christian faith, which alone can establish a 
relation of Encounter. 
He contends that mysticism, moraIism, and speculation are all basically 
alike in rejecting the "discontinuity" of revelation. The three form a single 
type of "universal religion" to which he opposes the Christian Faith as 
alone "personal" and non-mystical. Mysticism and speculation have in 
common the conviction that the divine lies at the basis of man's soul as an 
inmost kernel of his being, and that what is required is only a turning 
inwards and descent into man's own being. Mysticism and speculation 
differ only in nonessential ways, only in terms of the method (whether 
ratiocination or the techniques of prayer). ". . . In both instances it is the 
self-movement of man whose aim is God, whether it be through the soaring 
of thought or the introversion of the mystic. Both are in sharp contrast to 
the Christian faith, where the movement is on the side of God, and the aim 
is man."" Brunner puts forward this view especially in Die Mystik und 
Das Wort, where he argues that the very subjectivity of religion-making 
it identifiable with feeling and with consciousness-stems from a speculative 
interest in locating the essence of Religion-an ideal of the Enlightenment. 
Brunner also places mysticism in the same camp with moralism. Here the 
"path" to be traveled is not of thought or prayer but of action. "Religious 
moralism is the self-assertion of the 'good man' who believes that by his own 
efforts he can be pleasing to God; mysticism is the withdrawal to the deepest 
self which is identical with the divine being. In neither process is there 
unconditional surrender of faith."28 Both moralism and mysticism, as 
Brunner sees them, assert "the continuity of human existence with the 
divine or with the absolute."29 
What is necessary to establish the personal is, then, a breach of continuity. 
The continuity of thought must . . . be broken through.. . . So long as men believe that it 
is poss~ble to know God apart from any special revelation, . . . they believe that He can be 
known In continuity with themselves (subjective Immanence); He IS therefore regarded 
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as a force which is continuous w ~ t h  the world (objective Immanence), as a mere Idea, not 
as a personality.30 
Mysticism, moralism, and speculation-each attempts in its own way to 
traverse an unbroken "way" to God. And such an attempt, for Brunner, 
can never succeed in finding a personal God, who is not "found" but 
"encountered." 
Thus Brunner's whole theology can be viewed as an elucidation of the 
contrast he would make between a mystical type of religion on the one 
hand and the Christian faith on the other. In Brunner's theology, we have 
an entirely systematic rejection of mysticism on the grounds that it is 
"impersonal." Brunner's type of theology has left Protestantism in a much 
weakened position for a critical appreciation of mysticism, for the reason 
that Brunner regards it as an impersonal type of religion to which he 
counterposes Christian faith as "personal." It is plain that his premises 
entail the utter rejection of any "Christian mysticism." What is not so plain 
and needs critical scrutiny is whether Brunner altogether avoids unmediated 
knowing simply by his reliance on a rational discontinuity like paradox. 
Some critical suggestions are made below in the final section, "Brunner in 
the Light of Von Hugel." 
VON HUGEL: THE PERSONAL A N D  THE MYSTICAL 
We would do well to restudy the relationship between the "personal" and 
the "mystical" to see if they are, indeed, so antithetical as Neo-Orthodoxy 
regards them. A promising starting point would be the work of the English 
Catholic lay-theologian, Baron van Hiigel (1852- 1925), whose major 
work, a study of St. Catherine of Genoa, The Mystical Element of Religion, 
had as its chief theme the relationship of the "personal" and the "mystical." 
Von Huge1 submitted himself and all that he wrote to the Roman Catholic 
Church, but he was a "liberal" Catholic of his time and, in accord with 
Catholic Modernism, thought the hierarchy of his day failed to appreciate 
the work of Biblical scholarship and in its doctrinal formulations com- 
promised its results. Von Huge1 had an international acquaintance and 
correspondence with leading religious thinkers, both Catholic and Protes- 
tant, and was a special friend and adviser of Evelyn Underhill. His primary 
interest was to give a responsible reinterpretation of the mystical tradition 
in Christianity; and above all he stressed the need to understand the mystics' 
"One" more in the analogy of an integrated "personality" than as a Neo- 
platonist and Pseudo-Dionysian abstraction. 
Both Baron von Huge1 and Emil Brunner regard the Christian Faith as 
a religion which preeminently emphasizes the value of the "person" or 
"personality." While von Hugel and Brunner have different ways of 
describing the "personal," each is clear that the Christian Faith, if it is to be 
consistent with its character, cannot be promulgated in any form which 
"depersonalizes" the relationship between man and God. Both von Hiigel 
and Brunner are wary of losing transcendence in the subjectivism of mystical 
feeling, but von Huge1 thinks that transcendence can be safeguarded by 
reinterpreting mysticism so as to minimize its excesses. 
Mysticism as a Complex and not a Type. Von Huge1 holds that mysticism 
is a doctrine and a phenomenon with a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. 
He does not favor mysticism in its undiluted, or as he says somewhat con- 
fusingly, "pure" (i.e., "false") form-which is to  say a mysticism uncorrected 
of such aberrations as  fanaticism and over-zealous asceticism. In von 
Hiigel's diagnosis of what is wrong with mysticism, he focuses on its 
overly geometric view of "unity." Mysticism is, among other things, a 
prayerful impulse toward unity, but von Hiigel wishes to reinterpret the 
view of unity inherited from Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius. Too often, in 
the hands of the mystics, the Plotinian "One" as the end of their contempla- 
tive quest became a simple blank circle beyond all distinctions whatever. 
But as von Hugel, the realist, was fond of saying, life "here below" requires 
distinctions-moral ones and theoretical ones. When the view of unity is 
too simple, then man's spirituality can be kept "pure" only by placing his 
this-worldly interests outside the circumference of the circle, the One. Unity 
should be reinterpreted as a "unity-in-diversity." 
Von Hiigel is famous for his description of three elements of religious 
life which, he says, must be brought into unity without negating the special 
contribution of each. The first "element" is the external, authoritative, 
factual, historical, and institutional side of religion.31 This side accepts 
facts unreflectively and innocently like a child. The second, the rational, 
reflective, phiIosophical side, is to  be compared to the questioning of the 
youth, wherein accepted facts come to be replaced by a reflective scrutiny 
of them. The third, the emotive-intuitive element, is likened to the emotional- 
volitional-experimental side of the mature man. Here religion is "loved and 
lived rather than analyzed." These three elements he also compares to three 
emphases in the Church's institutional life: The parties-High Church, 
Broad Church, and Evangelical are roughly representative, in their respec- 
tive emphases, of the institutional, the philosophical, and the emotive 
elements. Among Roman Catholic orders, the identifications are: Jesuits, 
authoritative; Dominicans, speculative; and Franciscans, em0tive.3~ 
While he speaks of these as disparate "elements," at the same time he 
asserts that each is always accompanied by some amount of the other two. 
Religion is, then, in von Hiigel's view, always a combination of these, and 
it is the person who both achieves and is granted the grace of their unification 
into a living whole. Their harmonization is one of living forces and is, 
therefore, never fully finished in the same way that a harmony of thing-like 
elements could be finished. 
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The "mystical element" of religion is not to be understood as simply one 
of these three elements, but rather as a n  overall urge t o  unify diverse in- 
fluences such as these. An aberrant tendency of mysticism is that it seeks to 
unify them too simply by settling on one and disregarding others, thereby 
escaping what von Huge1 thought of as a healthy "friction." The mystic 
may fix on some institutional practice such as the sacrament or on some 
philosophical idea like Being, or he may, and often in mystical lyricism does, 
focus on the emotional satisfactions of the contemplative life, If, however, 
the mystic achieves his "unity" by avoiding all mixture of forces, he does 
not achieve the "unity-in-diversity" von Huge1 has in mind. What von 
Huge1 is constantly seeking to describe throughout his writing is a mysti- 
cism which is given full warrant to unify, but which is restrained from a 
simplistic solution which would shut out diverse experiential data to be 
unified. In his spiritual counsel and letters, the practical application of these 
ideas was that he often advised his correspondents to pursue some purely 
secular interest, The secular has an importance for the religious; one is not 
more "religious" simply by attending more and more to religion as a special 
subject or activity. Von Hugel, in fact, had worked out rather thoroughly 
the theme that Bonhoeffer had time to treat only fragmentarily. 
The Personal as the Analogue of Unity. The theme of much of von Hugel's 
writing, and especially of The Mystical Element of Religion, is that in the 
person or personality one can find the kind of unity which is necessary to 
harmonize diverse elements. Human personality is precisely a "living" rather 
than a geometric unity, and it can sustain conflicting elements with some 
cost, pain, or tension, but never, except in the fanatic, with so much tension 
that the unity is destroyed. It is in sustaining this living unity and bearing 
the tensions which this necessitates that the incipient person grows to be 
even more of a "person" and grows toward an approximation of the perfect 
personality exemplified only in God. 
Regrettably, von Huge1 never gave a complete theoretical description 
of what he meant by "person," "personal," and "personality"--terms which 
he used Ioosely-and today's reader needs to  be tolerant of the fact that he 
wrote before the insights of depth psychology and current personality 
theories. The data on which he based his judgments were the mystical 
experiences and commentaries of St. Catherine of Genoa, who, to von 
Hugel's mind, united within her personality a strong mystical attrait and 
a remarkable ability to see it in a critical light. 
Acceptance of Continuity. Since von Huge1 sees unity through the 
analogy of growth, he also views the relationship of nature t o  supernature 
as that of a continuum. "Nature draws us to God, as the dim, though most 
real background and groundwork of our existence; and Supernature raises 
this semi-conscious affinity to an active hunger for direct and clear vision, 
for a true participation in the Supernatural Life of G0d."~3 He, accordingly, 
would renounce the idea of the total corruption of human nature; and he 
warns against interpreting Christianity so Christocentrically as to deprive it 
of "dim apprehension, formless recollection, pictureless emotion, and the 
sense of the Hiddenness and Transcendence of the very God, Who is Im- 
manent and Self-Revealing, in various degrees and ways, in every place 
and time."J4 
As a consequence of this "gradualism," von Huge1 never takes disconti- 
nuity-the sudden, the miraculous or  abnormal-as, in itself, indicative of 
the supernatural. The spiritual life "even in its fulIest Christian develop- 
ments" is "essentially not miraculous but supernatural." He therefore 
assumes it is possible to discover certain "laws"3~ by which one can grow 
in the spiritual life-an assumption that lends his writing the air of authority 
of one who counsels others out of his own experience with spiritual questing. 
Much of von Hugel's writing took a form which would seem patronizing 
today-that of spiritual advice-giving to friends and correspondents. Of 
this style, the best known examples are his collection called Letters of Baron 
von Htigel to a Niece and his two volume series, Essays and Addresses. 
Transcendence and Immediately Experienced Certitude. Von Hiigel's 
epistemology is not worked out systematically but practically. He adopts 
the position that the test of reality is an immediate authentication in which 
every presentment of sense is accompanied by a "trans-subjective pressure" 
which has the effect of certifying, as valid and objective, what is given. Von 
Hiigel justifies this view on the grounds that skeptical critics of it also have 
to invoke surreptitiously "an immediately experienced certitude."36 
It has been said with some truth that, although a Catholic, von Hiigel 
was not a close student of St. Thomas Aquinas. With doubtful accuracy, it 
is also said that the interest he did have in Aquinas was stirred up by the 
Protestant, Ernst Troeltsch, whose scholarship von Hiigel greatly admired. 
The logical niceties of Thomism were not a special feature of his writing, 
which aimed rather at theorizing in order to deal with the practicalities met 
by those engaged in a spiritual quest. He assumed that his hearers were a 
sympathetic audience before whom he need not defend his views but only 
explain them. He explained them, however, with exhaustive thoroughness 
and with admirable intellectual rigor. Von Hiigel was not a Thomist and 
the reason is not difficult to discover. For Thomas the intellect must begin 
with sensory data. The intellect can know God only indirectly and predicate 
the "names" of God only analogically. ". . . our intellect, taking the origin 
of its knowledge from the senses, does not transcend the mode which is 
found in sensible things. , . ." ". . . we cannot grasp what God is, but only 
what He is not and how other things are related to Him. . . ."j7 For von 
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Huge1 negative predication implies some positive, direct, though "confused 
knowledge (I should prefer, with modern writers, to call it experience) of 
God's existence and nature [which is] possessed by the human soul, inde- 
pendently of its reasoning from the data of sen~e."~x 
Von Hiigel is happy to find in Thomas even a suggestion of direct 
knowledge of God even though the weight of Thomism is on the side of 
knowledge derived, analogically, from sensory experience: 
St. Thomas's admissions are especially striking, as  he usually elaborates a position which 
Ignores, and would logically exclude, such "confused knowledge." In his Expos~tion and 
Quesrlons on the Book of Boetlus on the Tr~nlty, after arguments to show that we know 
Indeed that God is, but not what He is,-at most onIy what He is not, he says: "We should 
recognize, however, that it 1s impossible, with regard to anything, to know whether ~t 
exlsts, unless, in some way or other, we know what it is, either with a perfect or with con- 
fused knowledge ... Hence also with regard to God,-we could not know whether He 
exists, unless we somehow knew what He is, even though in a confused manner."" 
It is evident that von Huge1 thought that the usual Thomistic bifurcation 
between knowing that and knowing what needed t o  be modified in order to 
allow for an immediacy of knowing "though in a confused manner." 
Thus that which needs to  replace clarity as a criterion is "confused 
knowledge" or, to put it more acceptably for von Hiigel, "vivid experience" 
of a "rich" reality. Immediacy of knowing, far from imprisoning one 
within a subjective cell, opens the self to  the transcendently real. All 
knowledge is a process which includes knowledge of both the Object and 
the Subject. "We do not know the Thing-in-itself, in the sense that we know 
nothing exhaustively, and that we do not, of course, know the Thing as 
outside our knowleage of it. But we do know the Thing in our knowledge 
of it, and we there know it without further mediation."40 
Thus there are two benefits of replacing a spatially conceived unity with 
a personal unity. First, "person" can be understood in such a way that the 
immediacy of God "within" the person need not imply mere subjectivity. 
Nor need it imply that the "immediacy" is that of a simple identification. 
Second, the discontinuity of reason need not be taken as the only means of 
expressing the mystery of God. Mystery will not be a void but the obscurity 
of Reality. 
Ethics. In ethics the reinterpretation of unity that von Huge1 recommends 
has three major effects. First, a unity-in-diversity will allow and encourage 
a variety of interests and ends. While there may be a tension between this- 
worldly and that-worldly ends, this tension need not become the destructive 
conflict it would necessarily become if these ends were regarded as in com- 
petition for "space" within a unity. Cultural, social, and moral activities 
not directly "religious" in nature may be accorded a positive usefulness to 
the religious life itself, 
Second, for this reason, there need be no conflict between "person" and 
Lrthing.n If "person" is understood as a unity-in-diversity, then that which is 
G'personal" cannot be defined in such a way that it contrasts absolutely with 
"things." The practical effect of this conception is that seemingly "im- 
personal" things-creeds, historical facts, institutions, as well as secular 
interests-are indeed found to be among the elements which constitute 
personal unity. In von Hiigel's view, the "person" would therefore be im- 
periled if there were an attempt to do  away with these necessary "externals," 
the "thing-element" in religion. 
Third, reinterpreting the concept of unity helps solve problems which 
become acute in what von Hiigel calls "False" mysticism: First, with a 
spatial concept of unity, the problem of passivity and activity is especially 
acute because the action of man and the action of God are likely to be re- 
garded as two forces in competition. Such a competition is not necessary if 
the action of God were conceived as "operating in and through and with 
our own." The other problem is that False mysticism is likely to interpret 
the "purity" of "Pure Love" as a spatial unity from which other elements, 
even those of ethical discrimination, must be excluded. In this respect the 
"purity" of love is made to depend on its rational discontinuity and dis- 
interestedness. With the revised concept of unity, "purity" need not exclude 
rational discrimination or secondary motives. 
The Personal and the Mystical. Personality, then, at its best and when 
most developed, has an apprehension of the eternal and simultaneous while 
it is engaged in its contact with the wide variety of external "things" furnished 
it by actual living. Indeed, to regard total disengagement as necessary was 
a mistake of '"false" or uncritical mysticism, whose concept of unity made it 
possible to see the eternal only as excluding externals. Its asceticism consti- 
tuted an impoverishment of the personality, which is, in fact, enriched 
rather than impoverished by the stimulus of externals. Nevertheless, such 
contact should not be a simple busy occupation with externals, even in 
corrected, critical mysticism, but rather "action" instead of "activity." This 
requires an appropriate kind of asceticism-one which acknowledges that 
some pain and suffering is an inevitable accompaniment of growth, but 
which would on no account allow suffering to  be an end in itself or to be 
regarded in any way as "good."4' 
A geometrically conceived unity, with a quite fixed circumference, must 
always provoke either-or, all-or-nothing choices. It achieves a tidy intellec- 
tualism and clarity at the cost of preempting the untidy "richness" of actual 
experience. In contrast, an organically conceived unity may permif shades 
of difference and conflicts as healthful stimuli, and it is more faithful to 
what is required by the actual rough-and-tumble of human experience as 
well as to the immediate, real, though dim, apprehension of the eternal in 
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experience. It acknowledges a mystery of mist, of a "confused knowledge" 
of "rich" reality. Love, even "Pure Love" need not ignore or disengage itself 
from other ends of self-advantage or motive-provided such ends do  not 
become controlling, A more ample view of unity may include within it both 
recipiency and action so that there can be a continuum between that which 
lies inherent in the human heart which prompts it to be receptive, and that 
which is disclosed to it by virtue of divine initiative. Mysticism, thus cor- 
rected, prompts the development of the person while it encourages his 
apprehension of transcendence in that divine discontent which he perceives 
within his person. 
BRUNNER IN THE LIGHT OF VON HUGEL 
In view of the great differences between Brunner and von Hugel, we 
must take seriously their common assumption that Christianity must involve 
a "personalism." It suggests that if a distinctly Christian Mysticism is pos- 
sible, it must augment and certainly not annul the personalist element. 
Whether a Christian Mysticism is in fact a viable theological position is a 
question about which von Huge1 and Brunner disagree, but the study of 
both suggests that the test, the theoretical condition of its possibility, is 
the presence in mysticism of that feature which is essential to its being a 
Christian mysticism-the "personal." Just how this essential "personalist" 
element is to find theological expression remains unresolved-a perennial 
challenge to Christian theology. 
The chief issue which influences the two estimates of the personal and 
the mystical is the attitude toward "continuity." Underlying von Hugel's 
estimate of the relationship of mysticism and personalism is his view of 
mysticism as a complex and not as a type. He is thus free to find in this 
compIex phenomenon certain elements capable of contributing to a person- 
alism. His presuppositions are also related to  his view of "person" as a 
"unity-in-diversity" in which growth is not unilinear but multilinear, and in 
which introspection need not be egocentricity but a prerequisite of growth. 
For Brunner we find, however, that "continuity" is, in a word, his summary 
of what is wrong with mysticism. Accordingly, he chiefly tries to combat 
mysticism by asserting the "discontinuity" of the man-God relation. 
Brunner's theology does not, however, altogether avoid continuity, as he 
insists that it must. Encounter requires a continuity of present time, a n  
immediacy of contemporaneity, between the "I" and the "Thou." Thus 
there is a sense in which Encounter can be regarded as immediately given 
knowledge so that Brunner allows time, if not reason, to  be a universal 
matrix, unifying men. This possibility is shown by his special stress on the 
church as a living fellowship (and not a depository of doctrine) within 
which menpresentl~~ encounter the living Christ.4' His view of the role of 
theology, and especially the task of apologetics, also shows that on the one 
hand he puts away the autonomy and "continuity" of a rationalism, but 
that on the other he substitutes for it a language of paradox which serves 
as a reminder for the community of what it presently (immediately?) believes. 
The sociality of the community should not obscure the fact that the meaning 
of the paradox is found "inside" it and is exclusive to it. One must first be 
inside before the meaning of the paradox is either understood, grasped, or 
encountered. A reliance on paradox thus can have the effect of sealing off 
the community from communication with the "outside" by reason of its use 
of a Ianguage that only members of the community can comprehend. This 
appraisal is affirmed by Brunner's view of apologetics and of theology as 
an elucidation of that which is already believed. A believer, in Brunner's 
opinion, can thus give no reasons for his faith, he can only point to the faith 
he aiready (presently) has.43 
Here there is a lapse, I think, in Brunner's scrupulous avoidance of 
immediacy and "continuity." There is an immediacy of contemporaneity 
between the "I" and the "Thou,"44 And there is an immediacy of interiority 
-an exclusivism-in a community that speaks primarily t o  itself, in theologi- 
cal language modeled specially for its own understanding of itselJ Brunner 
does not altogether avoid a11 forms of "immediacy" and "continuity" and, 
therefore, he does not altogether avoid a feature he himself regards as 
"mystical." 
A second line of criticism lies in the fact that Brunner develops his theology 
of Christian personalism by means of its contrast with "impersonal" ele- 
ments. Some of these, however, as von Hugel's view shows, can be extremely 
useful if not essentiaI to the "person." Truth of the objective-subjective 
antithesis and ethicaI principles, ends, and motives are, I think, rightly 
regarded as "things" useful to the "person." In Brunner's conception and 
development of personalism, it is difficult to give these "thing-elements" a 
legitimate pIace, try as he might. It is true that Brunner recognizes the need, 
or rather the necessity, of an impersonal element in personal relationships, 
but it is impossible in his theology to admit the desirability of a "thing- 
element" in personal relationship-4.g.: "Man is only 'person' in a parabolic, 
symbolic sense, 'person' who is at the same time 'not person,' a 'thing': God 
is pure personality; man is not."45 The fact that Brunner excludes "things" 
on principle (that they are impersonal) means that, if he is to be consistent, 
he must treat all things as equally impersonal and as equally useless to the 
"person." In the process he discards far too much. He all but discards 
man's capacity to make rational moral decisions because to do  so is to  
employ a "thing," a reason, as an end. Here we have come very close to a 
feature of "false mysticism" von Huge1 describes as pure or  disinterested 
love: the ideal of detachment from "things," the refusal to distinguish 
between one "thing" and another-all being indistinguishable in the Divine 
Unity. 
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A look at Brunner's theology from the standpoint of von Huge1 suggests 
several avenues of further thought. 1) It raises the question of whether it is 
possible or even desirable to write theology with an eye to expunging from 
it all mysticism. Some traces, in the form of temporal immediacy and in the 
form of unmotivated love ("disinterested love," the mystics called it) seem 
to creep in through the cracks. 2) Brunner works within an antithesis which 
asks us to choose between two types of religion. But is the antithesis neces- 
sary? Must the choice be mysticism and impersonalism versus I-Thou 
encounter and personalism? The choice seems dictated by strict typological 
thinking in the first place. 3) Can we be as sure as Brunner appears to be 
that "continuity" is, in itself, a depersonalizing idea? Need the act of intro- 
spection imply outright subjectivism and an abridgment of transcendence? 
Feeling that it is necessary to keep a strict account of whether it is we who 
act or God who acts implies an overly mechanical view of the self as a kind 
of billiard baIl that either acts or is acted upon. The choice for von Huge1 
would not be either-or. 4) Not every element in the mystical-contemplative 
tradition is desirable. The list of fanaticisms and excesses is long and often 
recited, but the most responsible theological commentary on mysticism is 
not achieved by treating mysticism as a type of religion but as a complex 
of goods and evils. And, certainly, given the popular interest in mysticism 
today, responsible ecumenical commentary is sorely needed. 
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